What’s the single biggest UPST stock mover this quarter?

Balance-sheet de-risking pace—evidence that credit risk is moving off balance sheet at scale.

Does rising UMI always mean worse outcomes?

Not necessarily. If risk is priced correctly at origination, a higher UMI can be offset or even favorable for revenue.

Why focus on Auto, HELOC, and SDL?

They broaden Upstart’s addressable market and diversify mix—provided third-party funding scales with demand.

What would count as a negative surprise?

Stalled off-balance-sheet transitions or signs that funding partners are pulling back.

What’s the baseline expectation?

A modest topline roughly in line with guidance plus visible progress on de-risking and funding durability.

UPST Q3 TL;DR — Fear’s Loud, Data’s Louder

Henry Dierkes
3 days ago
2 min read

Glowing globe with network lines on a dark background. Text reads "Upstart Q3 2025 Earnings Preview" in white. Futuristic vibe.

Q2 proved the model isn’t dead (102% YoY revenue growth, swing to GAAP profit). The stock still got crushed on balance-sheet optics ($600M convert, R&D loans for new products) and a later-corrected delinquency scare. Heading into Q3 (Nov 4), the tape is hypersensitive to funding durability and how fast credit risk moves off balance sheet. (See BTIG correction and UMI context in the charts on pp. 8–10.)

UPST Q3 Earnings Preview

What changed under the hood

Mix is diversifying. T-Prime hit a record $699M originations in Q2 and remains >20% of personal loans (p. 3). Newer verticals—Auto, HELOC, SDL—now top 10% of originations (p. 2).
Partners are scaling again. Three new CUs announced in Q3, plus Pathward (bank, ~$7B AUM) flagged on Oct 21—Upstart’s largest partner in ~2 years (p. 5).
UTPI says momentum, with a wobble. Trustpilot 28D MA at 32.61; 2,600 Q3 reviews (+7.3% QoQ). August/September dip = real, Q4 start slightly slower but +84% YoY for first 26 days (pp. 12–14).
The BTIG scare was overstated. Initial “11.2%” 30D+ DQs got corrected to 6.2% weighted average. Stock hasn’t fully retraced the hit (pp. 8–9).

What actually moves the stock on print

Balance-sheet de-risking pace. Management signaled some new-product exposure is already moving off-BS; the market wants proof at scale (pp. 6–7).
Funding lane clarity. Show that Auto/HELOC/SDL demand is there and third-party capital is ready to take it.
Credit signaling vs. pricing. UMI rising ≠ doom if priced in at origination (pp. 9–10).

The range that matters (and the author’s base case)

Conservative: Q3 ~$258M; FY25 ~$1.02B (below guide).
Baseline (80% weight): Q3 ~$270M; Q4 ~$314M; FY25 ~$1.055B (in line).
Aggressive: Q3 ~$288M; Q4 ~$337M; FY25 ~$1.095B (beat). Probability curves on p. 16 visualize this.
Author’s call: Q3 ~$275M, Q4 guide ~$315M, FY25 guide nudged to ~$1.06B, GAAP profitable (p. 17).

Our plain-English read

If they show real progress shrinking balance-sheet credit risk and affirm funding depth for Auto/HELOC/SDL, the bar’s low enough (~$53 share price as of the report) that even a slight Q3 topline miss can go green. If de-risking stalls, the narrative reverts to “it’s 2021 all over again,” and you won’t get paid for the mix shift.

One line that stuck: Girouard on new verticals—demand could be “an order of magnitude larger” than unsecured personal loans. Big if true; funding has to meet it (pp. 6–7).

Editor’s note (for investors/builders): Watch the slide on UTPI (p. 12), the BTIG correction graphic (p. 8), UMI (p. 10), and the revenue-scenario table/distribution (pp. 15–16). That’s the story. Not investment advice.